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Euroscepticism in Italy and in Hungary in the light of economic, financial, and political 
crisis. The financial crisis became the main focus of the political debates and discourses 
among the Italian and the Hungarian political parties between 2008 and 2013. In Italy 
and Hungary, Euroscepticism is still on the rise. In the first chapter, I will shortly sum‑
marise the conceptual framework of Euroscepticism. In the second chapter, I provide an 
overview of the way Hungarian and Italian political discourse has envisioned Europe 
in the post ‑bipolar, or post ‑Maastricht, period that began in the early 1990s. The fall 
of the Berlin wall had a decisive impact on the domestic politics of Hungary and Italy, 
and subsequent international changes created the basis for different forms of transi‑
tions in both countries. Hungary left behind dictatorship and the one ‑party system to 
create a functioning democracy, whereas Italy experienced the end of the political party 
system of the “First Republic,” giving birth to the highly promising “Second Republic.”
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Introduction
This comparative paper examines the reasons and the features of the rising 
Euroscepticism in Italy and in Hungary in the light of economic, financial, 
and political crisis. The financial crisis became the main focus of the political 
debates and discourses among the Italian and the Hungarian political parties 
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between 2008 and 2013. In Italy and Hungary, Euroscepticism is still on the 
rise (Molnár 2011; Molnár 2012; Molnár 2013)
In the first chapter, I will shortly summarise the conceptual framework 
of Euroscepticism, which is a negative or sceptical attitude towards the Eu‑
ropean integration process. The literature addresses both Euroscepticism at 
both the party and individual levels, as well as soft and hard Euroscepticism; 
that is, sceptic public opinion towards the EU as a whole or the member‑
ship of a country in the EU, versus public scepticism of only one common 
policy. In the second chapter, I provide an overview of the way Hungarian 
and Italian political discourse has envisioned Europe in the post ‑bipolar, or 
post ‑Maastricht, period that began in the early 1990s. The fall of the Berlin 
wall had a decisive impact on the domestic politics of Hungary and Italy, and 
subsequent international changes created the basis for different forms of tran‑
sitions in both countries. Hungary left behind dictatorship and the one ‑party 
system to create a functioning democracy, whereas Italy experienced the end 
of the political party system of the “First Republic,” giving birth to the highly 
promising “Second Republic.”
This time period can also be considered the post ‑Maastricht era, because 
European integration has had an increasing impact on domestic politics and on 
the national party system in the years since the Maastricht Treaty (Mair 2000). 
As the EU has become more and more integrated and, as a result, complicated, 
society has become increasingly critical of the union, rising questions about the 
perceived democratic deficit, information deficit, and communication deficit of 
the EU, as well as other issues.
The following section focuses on individual and party attitudes towards the 
EU public opinion towards the membership of Italy and Hungary, and the opin‑
ion of the governments and political parties about the institutional reform of the 
European Union based on primary and secondary sources. In order to analyse 
Euroscepticism, Eurobarometer surveys are used. For both Hungary and Italy, 
the Euro has become a modernisation symbol, and a certain “EU ‑enthusiasm” 
or Euro ‑enthusiasm can be observed in order to join the Eurozone (Italy) or 
EU (Hungary). Following the realisation of these projects there has been an 
ever growing euroscepticism (Hungary, Italy) or Euro(‑coin)‑scepticism (Italy), 
and less and less confidence due to waning economic advantages. The “euro” 
in Euroscepticism refers to the European integration, and “Euro” in Euro‑
‑scepticism refers to the common currency. Similarities between two major 
Italian and Hungarian politicians, Berlusconi and Orbán, make the countries 
valuable cases for comparison. Indeed, both leaders have pursued populist, soft‑
‑Eurosceptic policies with respect to media laws, migration policy, and security 
policy (Körösényi –Patkós 2015)
In the third chapter, I focus on the causes of growing Euroscepticism (party 
level or individual Euroscepticism) in Italy and in Hungary as a consequence of 
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the financial and economic crisis 2008). In my research I analyse the post ‑crisis 
period, which more or less coincides with a second transition period.
Table 1: Transitions
Italy Hungary
1947–1992/93 First Republic 1949–1989 Second Republic 
1992/93–2011/13 „Second Republic” 1989–2012 Third Republic 
2011–13 beginning of the „Third republic”? 2012–  Forth Republic
The importance of my research field is confirmed by the fact that the first draft of 
the new Global Strategy of the EU in 2015 emphasised that “The European Union, 
too, is more contested. The financial and economic crisis has posed a serious chal‑
lenge to European unity. Many Europeans have been hit by the crisis, and have 
come to view themselves as losers of globalisation. This is feeding certain constitu‑
encies within Member States which express criticism of, if not outright opposition 
to, the European project. This trend, which often blends legitimate grievances 
with a dangerous mix of nationalism, populism, protectionism and even racism, 
is exposing a new rift within the EU and bringing new anti ‑establishment forces 
to the fore. It is a divide between elites and citizens manifested in voter disaffec‑
tion, and a lack of trust in public institutions and policies. (…)
A more contested EU is bringing about broader external challenges. The rise 
of nationalism, protectionism and illiberalism could expose European nations 
to the lure of anti ‑democratic models promoted from outside. Populism and rac‑
ism could feed fortress Europe mentalities, undermining credible enlargement 
and neighbourhood policies, forthcoming migration and mobility policies, and 
even trade liberalisation.” (European External Action Service 2015: 8)
 
Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism is a negative or sceptical attitude towards the European inte‑
gration process (Taggart – Szczerbiak 2001). Euroscepticism exists at both the 
party level and the individual level. Gabel and Whitten stated that the worsening 
economic situation has had a positive impact on the level of individual Euro‑
scepticism, as in it has increased euroscepticism (Gabel – Whitten 1997: 81).
A division can be mentioned between soft and hard euroscepticism. Soft 
euroscepticism includes, for example, opposition to certain policies of the EU. 
Those who express revulsion against the political or economic ‘deepening’ of 
the EU (e.g. objection against the introduction of the Euro) are also counted 
among ‘soft sceptics’. In short, those who belong to the soft wing of eurosceptics 
are not against European integration, but have different opinions about par‑
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ticular measures. They attach primary importance to the promotion of national 
interest. In contrast, the representatives of the hard euroscepticism are totally 
against the political and economic integration, and they even oppose the EU 
membership of their own country (Taggart – Szczerbiak 2001: 8). They gener‑
ally express criticism against capitalism, liberalism and socialism considering 
these as certain power tools of the EU.
There is a large variety of levels and opinions concerning the European 
integration process. Kopecky and Mudde (2002) established the categories 
of Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Europragamatists, Eurorejects. Analysing 
Italian political parties, Conti and Verzichelli defined five different types of 
attitude towards European integration. According to their classification, the 
centre ‑left parties (PPI, DS, and later the PD) represent identity Europeanism, 
the extreme left (RC) represent hard euroscepticism, centre ‑right parties (FI, 
AN) display functional Europeanism and soft euroscepticism, and the Extreme 
right (LN) float somewhere between functional, soft, and hard Euroscepticism 
(Conti 2003).
Since 2012 the Hungarian Europe Society has been conducting a regular 
monitoring research project to examine the attitude of the Hungarian political 
parties towards the EU, and created its own PERC ‑index categories. 1 represents 
the “total rejection of any kind of European integration” and 10 “the complete 
acceptance of a full ‑blown European federalism” to measure their attitude be‑
tween June 2009 (European elections) and mid‑2012. In the PERC ‑index 1. is 
Euro ‑destructive, 2. is Europhobe, 3. is Hard eurosceptic, 4. is Soft eurosceptic, 
5. is Europessimist, 6. is Europragmatist, 7. is Soft europragmatist, 8. is Euro‑
‑constructive, 9. is Eurooptimist and 10. is Federalist. The executive summary 
of the project stated that no Hungarian parliamentary party received 1 (real 
Euro ‑destructive which would refuse to participate in EP elections) or 10 (real 
federalist which offers a coherent federalist vision), that is the two opposite 
categories. (Európa Társaság 2013: 5)
First Transition Following the Collapse of the Bipolar World and 
the Post ‑Maastricht Period
Party attitudes towards the EU in Italy
In Italy up to 1990s, in reality European ‑level policy ‑making did not involve 
competition between large, oppositional coalitions, mainly due to the lack of 
the political alternation between governments of different political opinions and 
due to bipartisan EU ‑policy since the 1970s. It was only after the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc, the actions of “mani pulite” and the electoral reform (1993) that 
the two large opposing governmental coalitions took shape. The introduction 
of the majority principle in the electoral system contributed to the formation 
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of party coalitions which were more efficient in securing a stable governmental 
operation, thus creating the basis for the real political alternation of govern‑
ments. The events taking place in Italy during the early 1990s were considered 
by many as a “transformation” which marked the end of the “First Republic” 
and the birth of the highly promising “Second Republic” (Fabbrini 2009).
Although the collapse (1989–1991) of the Eastern Bloc served as a funda‑
mental impetus for change, the real political avalanche was launched by the 
corruption scandal that broke out around the Italian Socialist Party. In the case 
of Italy, however, it is not possible to speak about the birth of the new Republic 
in the traditional political or constitutional sense, as this process was not due 
to the elaboration and approval of a new constitution, but rather was the result 
of political changes concerning parties, the political elite and the party system. 
In the midst of major changes to the party system, smaller parties almost totally 
disappeared while the bigger ones were transformed to a large extent, with 
their support dropping. This remarkable transformation of the political and 
party system was connected to the renewal of the political elite and helped the 
creation of the bipolar party ‑system.
All of the main political parties have expressed a pro ‑European approach 
since the 1970s, but during the post ‑Maastricht Treaty period, different levels 
of Euroscepticism have emerged. On the left, the major successor of the PCI 
(Italian Communist Party), the PDS (Democratic Party of the Left, 1991–1998), 
later transformed into DS (Democrats of the Left) (1998–2009), emphasizing 
the social and democratic aspects and supranational federalist vision of the 
integration concentrating on welfare and social issues. The PDS/DS, a founder 
of the Party of European Socialists (PES), expressed this opinion during the 
electoral campaign of the 1999 EP elections with its political slogan: ‘yes to 
a market economy, no to a market society’. The Party for Communist Refoun‑
dation (PRC), the smaller of the two successor parties to the PCI, represented 
a different model of the integration. It expressed its critical opinion about the 
deepening of the integration and the institutional reform, voting against the 
Maastricht Treaty and later the European Constitutional Treaty, and criticising 
the wider incompetence of the EU. The PRC wanted and felt the absence of the 
articulation of some basic principles, like the ban of all wars and the creation 
of a full ‑employment economy. (Bardi 2007: 6–7; Conti 2003: 25)
The other main pro ‑European centre ‑left party, the PSI became one of the 
main losers of the party system crisis due to the actions of the so called ‘Mani 
Puliti’. The SDI (Italian Democratic Socialists), which was the most important 
successor of the PSI, maintained the pro ‑European, federalist attitude of its 
predecessor and lost significant support. The left and liberal Radical Party was 
also pro ‑European, and in its 2004 statute stated the necessity to strengthen 
‘the liberal, liberist, and libertarian struggle for liberal revolution and for the 
United States of Europe’. The party supported the federal development of the 
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integration based on the principle of subsidiarity in order to make decisions 
closer to the people. The 2000 statue of the Greens expressed a similar, pro‑
‑European opinion: ‘The Greens are those who work for the political unity of 
a Europe based on the principles of democratic federalism and subsidiarity.’ They 
represents that the environment is a key issue for the creation of the political 
unification of the Union. (Bardi 2007: 7)
The centre ‑left parties (e.g. DS, PPI) have been the most devoted supporters 
of the deepening European integration since the 90s with the aim of creating 
a supranational, federal union, highlighting the importance of a common Eu‑
ropean identity. Following the collapse of the Italian party system, the Italian 
Christian Democracy (DC) split into two major factions that headed in differ‑
ent political directions. The right wing of the DC created the CCD (Christian 
Democratic Centre) and the CDU (the United Christian Democrats, which later 
became the UDC, Union of Christian and Centre Democrats). The successors of 
the DC were all pro ‑European and in favour of the deepening of the European 
integration. The left wing of the DC founded the Italian Peoples Party (PPI). The 
PPI later played an important role in the creation of the centre ‑left Margherita.
In 1993, leaving a political vacuum behind, the Italian Christian Democracy 
finally dissolved, and the voter support of the successor parties also signifi‑
cantly decreased. Consequently, the vacuum in the internal politics was filled 
suddenly by a new type of political parties. On the right side of the political 
spectrum during the 1990s, three new parties emerged that attracted most of 
the voters with a right ‑wing orientation: Forza Italia (FI), National Alliance 
(Alleanza Nazionale – AN) and the Northern League. This process naturally 
did not occur without any precedents as the routes of the Northern League can 
be traced back already to the 80s. At the same time, the National Alliance grew 
out of the Italian Social Movement (MSI, Movimento Sociale Italiano). In 1993 
a new party emerged to oppose the centre ‑left coalition: Forza Italia. This party 
indeed constituted a totally new, unprecedented political construction. The 
huge vacuum in the right ‑wing was finally filled by the real ‑estate and media 
magnate Silvio Berlusconi.
At the beginning of the 1990s, Italy had to face serious economic problems. 
In 1992, the Lira was deflated by 7 percent (and then 30 percent), so, although 
only temporarily, Italy had to leave the European Monetary System. Simulta‑
neously, other macroeconomic indicators of the Italian economy, such as the 
foreign trade balance and the government debt, showed worsening trends, while 
Italy’s ability to join the European common currency also became less certain. 
During the first Berlusconi government in 1994, the Foreign Minister, Antonio 
Martino, criticised the EMU project. He emphasised that ‘the convergence was 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for monetary unification’. He also 
considered it necessary to renegotiate the convergence criteria of the Maastricht 
treaty. The Prime Minster Silvio Berlusconi also proposed the renegotiation of 
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the TEU so that Italy could join the EMU without fulfilling the convergence 
criteria. (Quaglia 2003: 11)
However, by the middle of 1990s, following the 1996 elections, the new 
centre ‑left ‘Olive ‑tree Coalition’ managed to re ‑stabilise the Italian economic 
balance. In November 1996, the Lira re ‑joined the European Monetary System. 
The ‘‘Olive ‑tree Coalition’ considered one of their priorities to fulfil the euro con‑
vergence criteria (Maastricht Criteria). (D’Alema 1998; Ciampi 2000a: 203–205) 
In this period, the problems of the Italian economy made it uncertain whether 
Italy could remain at all an important member of the European Union. The 
Prodi government considered their primary mission to conclude the necessary 
reforms. They set as their goal the elimination of economic problems and the 
reestablishment of the prestige of the political elite. They also sought to fulfil the 
euro convergence criteria, lead Italy back into the European Monetary System, 
get admitted into the Euro Zone, and reform of the public sphere and political 
institutions. (D’Alema 1997: 157) In the year 1997, in order to comply with the 
euro convergence criteria, without any resistance by the Italian public, they 
introduced a so called ‘one ‑time Euro tax’ to be valid only until the fulfilment 
of the criteria had been achieved. Owing to the success of the economic policy, 
Italy became a member of the Monetary Integration, which the centre left gov‑
ernment could account for as a great achievement when it was finally approved 
in Brussels on May 1, 1998. (Horváth 2000: 550–553) After the introduction 
of the Euro, analysts found that contrary to earlier difficulties, participation in 
the European Monetary meant a serious advantage for Italy; the interest rates 
for example decreased at a higher speed than in other states, and as analysts 
claimed, the 2000 oil crisis also impacted the Italian economy less than it would 
have were Italy to have faced the crisis on her own (Vaciago 2001: 208).
While after the introduction of the Euro several political fields (e.g. inflation‑
ary and monetary policies) became part of the common policies, several others 
remained under the authority of national governments (e.g. employment policy, 
technological development, tax policy and social policy). National govern‑
ments remained responsible for the reform of the latter political fields. In Italy, 
the execution of reforms was to a large extent made difficult by the economic 
problems that had cumulated during the preceding decades (e.g. the problems 
occurring in the Mezzogiorno, the high government debt and the relatively 
low R+D subsidies). Italian politicians (e.c. Massimo D’Alema, Carlo Azeglio 
Ciampi) worried about the country’s exclusion from the important issues con‑
cerning the integration in case of staying out of the Euro Zone (D’Alema 1998; 
Ciampi 2000a). Already during the first two Berlusconi governments (1994), 
the government began to drift away from the traditional EU policy. The new gov‑
ernment, through a more determined emphasis on national interests, stopped 
representing the traditional ‘follower’ EU policy of its predecessors. After the 
inauguration of the second Berlusconi government, communications concern‑
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ing the Euro seemed to underpin the worries of those who had concerns about 
the future of the integration. In early January 2002 the debate between some 
members of the government, like Umberto Bossi and the minister of foreign 
affairs concluded in the resignation of the foreign minister, Renato Ruggiero. 
During the years following her accession to the Euro Zone, Italy was still able 
to maintain the macro ‑economic indicators required by the convergence criteria 
(La Repubblica 2002; Corriera della Sera 2002).
Hungary
Following the collapse of the bipolar world, EC/EU membership has become 
the modernisation symbol of a prosperous, democratic and European Hungary, 
which has always been an organic part of Europe. In the period of the collapse 
of the socialist state, the primary goal of the main Hungarian political parties 
was immediate accession to the European Union. As Hungary, during the eight‑
ies, had a special, albeit limited, experience of liberalisation in economic and 
political fields, it was considered the best prepared country in the region among 
the first group of states to join the EC/EU.
During the first free election campaign in 1990 there was a common agree‑
ment among the political parties that the most important foreign policy goal 
was early Hungarian membership in the EU. There was only one anti ‑European 
political party: the communist Workers’ Party, which was an extra ‑parliamentary 
movement following the first free elections and the smaller of the two successor 
parties to the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. Apart from this movement, 
all the mainstream parties that formed during the period of peaceful transi‑
tion in the period 1987–1989 were pro ‑European, but some differences can be 
identified in their political goals regarding EU membership and integration.
The Hungarian Social Democratic Party (HSDP) and the Hungarian Social‑
ist Party (HSP, the main successor party to the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party) emphasised concentration on welfare issues, social democratic aspects, 
and a supranational federalist vision of integration. As a consequence of the 
1990 electoral failure of the HSDP, the traditional social democratic party was 
not able to form a parliamentary party. Following the transitory period, from 
1991 onwards the socialist party (the larger of the two successor parties to the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) became one of the most important main‑
stream parties, and by 1993 had transformed into a centre ‑left party of a ‘social 
democrat’ or ‘social liberal’ kind. As a testimony of its pro ‑European attitude, the 
HSP frequently called the attention of the Western European public and politi‑
cians to the very important role of Gyula Horn, the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, in the German unification (Navracsics 1997: 10–11; Mayr 2009). The pro‑
‑EU left ‑wing actors (e.g. HSP and the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD)), have 
considered the accession as anti ‑nationalistic and part of the modernisation 
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project. These parties have emphasised the economic advantages of member‑
ship, and the finalisation of the change of the regime.
The AFD and Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), concentrated on the 
neoliberal, capitalistic approach of the European economy based on free trade 
principles. For the liberals, EU membership was the only way to modernise the 
country. After a short transitional period of sharing similar visions concerning 
the EU, their political paths diverged: the AFD, while turning into an authentic 
social ‑liberal party, started to concentrate on the social democratic aspect of 
the EU, whereas Fidesz moved towards a more conservative interpretation of 
Europe, defining itself as a liberal conservative party (Navracsics 1997: 12).
Conservatives focused on the political aspects of European integration based 
on the conception of a Europe of nations. The Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(HDF), the Independent Smallholders’ Party (ISP), and the Christian Demo‑
cratic People’s Party, defined Europe by its cultural aspects, emphasising that 
Hungary was an organic part of the West, but ‘it was violently isolated from its 
natural environment for forty years’ (Navracsics 1997: 13). Thus, their political 
slogan was not ‘the road to Europe’, but return to Europe.
Individual attitudes towards the EU or the introduction 
of the Euro
Italy
The deepening of European integration was not only supported by the chang‑
ing governments, but also by the Italian public. Among the countries of the EU, 
it was Italy whose population supported this process most. The future of Italy 
was considered as dependent on the country’s role in the EU. The Italian public 
has been an ardent devotee of integration, even more so than the EU average.
In 2004 the Flash Eurobarometer showed the confidence of Italians in the 
Constitutional reform of the European integration. The majority of Italians (82 
percent) seemed to agree that without a Constitution, the Institutions of the 
European Union could reach a deadlock, so they recognised the usefulness of 
a Constitution (European average 69 percent) (Eurobarometer 2004).
Italians traditionally have greater confidence in EU institutions than in their 
national ones. In Spring 2005, Eurobarometer survey showed that 56 percent 
of Italians trusted the European Union, while 33 percent who did not (Euro‑
barometer 2005: 2). In 2005 the level of support was lower than in June ‑July 
2004, when more than 90 percent of Italians supported the Constitution, and 
accordingly viewed constitutional reform positively. However, only 15 percent 
of Italians knew the text of the Constitution (EU–25 WATCH No. 2. 2006: 69). 
As showed by the Eurobarometer 2006 (Spring), 78 percent of the Italians were 
not familiar with the whole contents of the European Constitution, or had never 
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heard of the Constitution itself. It is important to underline that the average 
level of knowledge of the texts of the Constitution was quite low. However, 78 
percent of Italians agreed with the statement that the adoption of the Consti‑
tution would make the EU more democratic, while 76 percent agreed it would 
make the union more efficient and more transparent.
According to the Eurobarometer survey after the French and Dutch ‘no’ ref‑
erendum about the European Constitution, the relative majority of the Italian 
interviewed (37 percent) stated that EU Member States should continue the 
ratification process. And 33 percent answered that the European Constitution 
should be renegotiated. Only 6 percent of Italians said that the European Con‑
stitution should be abandoned, while 23 percent abstained from answering. In 
spring 2006 ’56 per cent of the Italian sample considers that for Italy to be part 
of the EU is a good thing’ (Eurobarometer 65 2006: 3–5).
For the majority of Italians the EU membership was still an advantage. How‑
ever, during that time period, a wider scale of opinions regarding EU issues can 
be noticed, and there was a more critical approach in the public debate. Accord‑
ing to the 2007 Spring Eurobarometer survey, 74 percent of Italians surveyed 
agreed with the opinion that ‘every European decision is the subject of negotia‑
tions in which the opinions of the national governments of all Member States 
are taken into account’. Furthermore, 53 percent of Italians thought the ‘voice 
of Italy counts in Europe’, and 55 percent anticipated ‘that Italian influence 
in the EU will be even stronger in the future’. Italians decisively support the 
European management instead of the national one in certain policies such as 
foreign and defence affairs (67 percent), energy (68 percent), immigration (67 
percent), the fight against crime (63 percent), and environment (60 percent). 
Italians agreed with the concept of the so ‑called ‘Multi ‑speed Europe’ where 
those member states which are prepared to strengthen the level of integration 
of a common European policy in certain areas could do so without waiting for 
the others (Eurobarometer 67 2007: 3–5).
A few months before abandoning the European Constitution, 72 percent 
of Italians still had a positive approach to the Constitutional Treaty, and 68 
percent of interviewees were optimistic about the future of the EU. The major‑
ity thought that the ‘European Union in the next 50 years will have a common 
army and will be a leading diplomatic power in the world’. 72 percent agreed 
with the notion that the European Union should have its own Foreign Minister. 
(Eurobarometer 67 2007: 3–5) In 2008 the relative majority of Italians still had 
a positive opinion about Italy’s membership in the EU, though a clear decline 
(from 50 percent to 39 percent) can be noticed. 37 percent of Italians thought 
about EU membership in a positive way, believing that Italy had benefited from 
its membership in the union. Half of the interviewees believed that the Italian 
position was not taken into account at the European level. It is important to 
underline that only 15 percent of Italians thought that MEPs paid attention to 
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their views and 14 percent thought the same about the European Commission. 
78 percent of Italian believed that national institutions were not transparent, 
and 50 percent thought the same about European institutions. Still, the relative 
majority of Italians maintained confidence in the European Union (40 percent), 
yet the number of sceptics was growing (Eurobarometer 69 2008: 2–3).
Hungary
Following the collapse of the communist regime, the image Hungarians formed 
of Europe was determined by their economic and political expectations. In 
the referendum held on the issue of EU membership (2003), the turn ‑out was 
45.6 percent, and 83.76 percent of the voters said ‘yes’.2 So, despite relatively 
low participation, the Hungarian population voted overwhelmingly for acces‑
sion. According to Miklós Sükösd, the low turnout might have been caused by 
the lack of genuine debate in the political sphere. That is, there had been no 
serious arguments for or against the accession of Hungary, and all this had 
led to a staggeringly low interest in the European issues. The communication 
campaign started abruptly, and rather late, which also contributed to the com‑
munication deficit (Sükösd 2005).
It is necessary to mention that the communication deficit was not only 
a Hungarian problem, but also a problem that practically all the member states 
confronted. Nevertheless, it seems important to examine the specific reasons 
for the growing disappointment among the Hungarian population in the years 
following the accession. István Hegedűs emphasized that the Hungarian press 
was not able to convey the gravity of the Hungarian accession and the Euro‑
pean integration (Hegedűs 2005). The adoption of the acquis by the Hungarian 
administration did not create a heated debate in the press, except for during 
the final phase of the negotiation process, when it was mainly common issues 
(like the impact of accession on the use of poppy ‑seed as food ingredient) that 
appeared in the Hungarian media (Uitz 2008: 44).
In 2005, a poll was carried out in order to examine what Hungarians were 
thinking about the EU membership, and its local consequences (Medián 2005). 
Similarly to some other opinion polls of the period, 75 percent of the subjects 
were for the Hungarian membership, and 25 percent were against it. The number 
of supporters increased linearly with the educational level of the subjects asked, 
i.e. among those who had no secondary degree, the proportion of supporters 
was 70–75 percent, and in the case of professionals, this proportion was 80 
percent (Kormány 2006: 89).
2 Czech Republic: turnout – 55.21 percent, yes – 77.33 percent; Poland: turnout – 58.85 percent, yes – 77.45 
percent; Slovakia: turnout – 52.15 percent, yes – 92.46 percent;
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According to Marján, one of the main reasons for Hungarians’ sense of dis‑
appointment with the union was that prior to the accession, there were several 
myths among the Hungarian population about the fast rise of salaries, new 
employment possibilities and material subsidies similar to those enjoyed by 
beneficiaries of the Marshall plan. The potential EU membership of Hungary 
assured financial resources from the EC/EU. In spite of this, Hungarians were 
also afraid of losing sovereignty as well as the onset of fatal competition due to 
the opening of the markets (Marján 2006: 5).
These fears can be traced back to three main sources: a) even in spite of the 
intensive change ‑over to market economy, free market conditions could not yet 
come to life; b) market players were smaller and less developed, and so they 
felt insignificant in comparison to competitors. Finally, there was quite a lot 
of fear that costly regulations protecting the environment, consumers, and the 
labour force would be introduced. Not all the fears were well founded. In the 
spheres of industry and services, for example, no serious crisis took place after 
May 1, as most of the development had already taken place during the accession 
process through the liberalization of commercial and market contacts and legal 
harmonisation. And, most importantly, Hungary obtained real voting rights in 
the decision making process if the EU.
Another cause for fear regarding the accession for Hungarians was the issue 
of sovereignty. This arose from the fact that Community Law has primacy over 
national legislation. Like every other member, Hungary also gained the possibil‑
ity of enforcing the country’s interests as a member with voting rights. In the 
globalizing world, more and more problems can only be solved as a member of 
a larger international community. Moreover, for a small country like Hungary, 
this is the only road to success. Also the curious paradox can be mentioned that 
this fear occurred after Hungary’s full adoption, in the period of accession, of 
the 80 thousand page documentation of the acquis that had been formulated 
without the country’s representative participation in the EU legislation process. 
In fact, the real challenge for all the new members has been hidden in the pro‑
cess of convergence to EU average income (Marján 2006: 15).
The Eurobarometer of October 2006 already clearly showed Hungarian 
society’s disappointment with the EU accession. Since spring of that year, the 
support for EU membership has dropped by a further 10 percent, reaching 
39 percent, probably due to the country’s domestic political issues (elections, 
growing economic problems, general feeling of uncertainty).
In 2006, as seen from the Eurobarometer figures, trust in the institutions of 
the European Union was the highest among new member states. 82.5 percent 
of those who were supporters of Hungary’s membership thought that it meant 
a guarantee against the return of dictatorship. Among those, however, who were 
against it, agreement with this statement registered only 63.5 percent support. 
As to the statement that ‘the sovereignty of Hungary suffered with the acces‑
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sion of the country’, 76 percent of those against the membership claimed they 
agreed, while amongst those who supported the accession, this ratio was only 
43 percent. There was a slight majority among the subjects of those who though 
that the country suffered a disadvantage as a consequence of the accession (53 
percent), leaving merely 47 percent claiming that, on the whole, the accession 
brought about an advantageous result (Kormány 2006: 90).
The long ‑term benefits of accession were not debated. However, in the short 
run, the negative aspects of the process were felt by those who were threatened 
by existential uncertainty: something which was least applicable to the strata 
with the highest level of education. 54 percent of those interviewed agreed with 
the statement that ‘Hungary does not have a word in the EU legislation’, show‑
ing that a significant portion of the population was not aware even of the most 
basic facts about the European Union. (Kormány 2006: 91).
The issue of sustaining and preserving national traditions, as well as the 
alleged threat against them, became part of everyday discourse during the pro‑
cess of accession. This was reflected in the number of respondents who agreed 
with the statement, ‘The EU will threaten national traditions’ (40 percent). 36 
percent of those who claimed to follow the daily news reports regularly thought 
that the EU meant a threat to traditions, while this portion was 44.6 percent 
among those who reported they did not watch daily news. This shows a rela‑
tively low impact of the media interpretations of the accession on the public 
opinion. Nevertheless, the majority of respondents claimed that the accession 
would improve upon the conditions of the pre ‑accession period, in the fields 
of the country’s security (62 percent), human rights (57 percent), legal secu‑
rity (52 percent), and development of the economy (51 percent). Opinions on 
the following fields already reflected slight doubts as to the possible positive 
consequences: stability of democracy (49 percent) and financial stability (47 
percent) (Kormány 2006: 94–5). There were also negative expectations about 
the consequences of the accession with regard to finance, labor, health care, 
and, above all, agriculture.
In 2007, as seen in Hungary from the next Eurobarometer figures, approval 
of the country’s status as a member of the union continued to decline. Although 
the general support of the EU had never been as high as in 2007, this year 
showed the lowest support ever in Hungary. 57 percent of EU citizens thought 
that their country’s membership was ‘a good thing’, and only 15 percent viewed 
the membership as totally wrong. This indicated a 4 percent rise in approval as 
compared to the previous Eurobarometer. Contrary to this trend, 40 percent of 
Hungarians did not consider the EU accession beneficial for the country, and 
only 37 percent claimed that it was ‘good’. Hungarians are among the most 
pessimistic citizens, both as to the issue of membership (25th place), and to 
the advantages of membership (27th place in the rank order).
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Hungary was one of the three countries in which people who were of the 
opinion that accession had not brought about any benefit to their homeland 
constituted the majority.
Nevertheless, the trust in EU institutions (European Parliament and the 
Commission) was far stronger than the EU average. For Hungarians, the Eu‑
ropean institutions are more trustworthy than the national ones. In case of 
Hungary the reason for this can be found in the fact that the new member states 
have a short and sometimes negative experience in the ‘existing Hungarian 
capitalism and democracy’ and in the consolidation of national democratic 
political institutions. Citizens’ attitude to European symbols (the EU flag, an‑
them), the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), and of further 
accession was remarkably positive. The low acceptance rate of EU membership 
was primarily due to the widespread perception that the national economy was 
in a state of crisis. Only a staggering 9 percent of the respondents expressed 
a positive opinion about the Hungarian economic situation. This is proved by 
the figures expressing the changes in people’s opinion: in 2004 only 10 percent 
of the population thought the EU to be ‘a bad thing’, whereas by the spring of 
2009, this percentage had grown as high as 23 percent.
According to the data gathered by the Standard Eurobarometer of Autumn 
2008, Hungarian pessimism can be traced already in the answers to the first 
set of questions, as only 31 percent of the respondents evaluated membership 
positively, in contrast with the EU average of 53 percent. It is worth noting that 
in the Autumn of 2004 the percentage of positive responses was still high, at 49 
percent. While 60 percent of the EU average citizens claim that the EU imposes 
its opinion on the member states, only 57 percent of Hungarians share this view. 
At the same time, in contrast with the EU average of 60 percent, 47 percent of 
Hungarians think that their country’s opinion counts at the European level 
(Eurobarometer 2008: 31–32).
Growing Euroscepticism
Post ‑Euro ‑introduction Crisis: Italy
According to the results of a 1999 telephone poll with 2,003 subjects, the ma‑
jority of Italian citizens was aware of the fact that they would have to cover the 
costs of the introduction of the Euro, but they still believed that this process 
would play an important role in the development of the country. 85 percent of 
the respondents thought that it was good for Italy to be a member of the EU, 
and 92 percent of them considered the further strengthening the European 
Integration necessary (Battistelli ‑Bellucci 2002).
In the year 2000 the exchange rate of the Euro fell against the US Dollar, 
which was followed by a decrease of Italians’ trust in the common currency and 
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the common institutions. According to the poll of September 2000 carried out 
by Ipsos, a mere 58 percent of Italian citizens trusted the Euro, which though 
higher than the EU average (46 percent), was lower than the figures of two 
years before by 20 percent. (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2000) Similarly to the opinion poll 
data of the Ipsos, La Polis also came out with results referring to the decrease 
in people’s trust. In 1999 it was shown that 72 percent of Italians ‘trusted very 
much’ the EU institutions, while by 2000, this ratio fell to 57 percent. In 1999 
it was only a thin 25 percent of the respondents who thought that belonging 
to the EU was disadvantageous for the country, and this proportion grew to 
35 percent within a year’s time. In 1999, the majority (53 percent) of Italians 
thought that it was for the advantage of the country and its citizens to join the 
EU, while in 2000 only 41 percent agreed with this statement (Dente 2001: 
1054). Nevertheless, institutional reforms were still supported by Italians. This 
was shown by the data of October 2000 Eurobarometer in which 84 percent 
of Italian citizens agreed with the creation of a European Constitution. This 
ratio by far surpassed the EU average (70 percent). The outstandingly positive 
attitudes towards the EU of the Italian public may have originated from the 
more apparent disappointment in their own national institutions. Thus, it was 
the integration that they expected to lead to the economic development of the 
country. Together with the devaluation of the common currency, the trust in 
Brussels institutions began to decrease. The temporary crisis of the Euro raised 
the number of Italian Euro ‑sceptics measurably (Dente 2001: 1052).
After December 2004, the Commission’s interest in the Italian budget situa‑
tion gradually increased. It became known that the Italian government, similarly 
to Greece, accessed more credit each year than it reported to Brussels. During 
that year, the gradually growing government deficit and the structural problems 
of the Italian economy caused a steadily increasing problem. According to of‑
ficial data of the EU, Italy’s government deficit in proportion to the GDP was 
3.5 percent in 2003, 3.5 percent in 2004, 4.2 percent in 2005, and 4.4 percent 
in 2006. At the same time, government debt was 104.3 percent of GDP in 2003, 
1013–8 percent in 2004, 106.2 in 2005, and 106.8 percent in 2006. (Eurostat 
2008) In 2006, Italian government deficit was the highest in the Euro Zone. 
Padoa ‑Schioppa, minister of economy still thought at the end of 2006 that the 
2007 budget would give a chance for Italy for remaining below the 3 percent 
threshold (Corriere della Sera 2006). In April 2006, when an approximate 4 
percent deficit in proportion to the GDP was predicted, one of the analyses of the 
Financial Times even mentioned that Italy would have to leave the Euro Zone. 
The chance for this, however, was not substantive. Nonetheless, Italy was forced 
to execute further severe reforms to avoid this threat (La Repubblica 2006). In 
2009, as a consequence of the global crisis, all of the indicators listed above 
became more extreme. The government debt was as high as 110.5 percent, and 
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the government deficit reached 3.7 percent of the GDP. In addition, the govern‑
ment also experienced an GDP decrease of 2 percent.
It became evident that during those years that support for EU membership 
decreased significantly. In 1991, 78 percent, and in 1999, 62 percent of respond‑
ents considered membership a good thing, whereas only 39 percent in 2008 and 
41 percent in 2011 agreed with the statement. The proportion of those stating 
that membership was a bad thing rose from 4 percent to 17 percent between 
1991 and 2011, with a rise to 17 percent in 2008 at the peak of the financial crisis.
According to the data gathered by the Standard Eurobarometer in 1993 it 
was shown that 62 percent of Italians ‘tend to trust’ the European Commission, 
while by 2013 this percentage fell to 35 percent. Likewise, in 2003, 57.20 percent 
of Italians trusted the EU itself, while in 2013, only 23 percent declared this 
opinion (Eurobarometer 2015).
Italy – Eurosceptic approaches
In Italy, in spite of the strong pro ‑European orientation of public opinion, centre‑
‑right political parties began to embrace both hard and soft approaches to euro‑
scepticism. Already during the first (1994), but manifestly during the Berlusconi 
governments, eurosceptic approaches surfaced on a national level (Quaglia 
2003). It must be emphasized that the different parties of the centre right coali‑
tion (House of Freedom) represented different levels of euroscepticism.
Forza Italia’s attitude regarding the EU was very fluid because of its wide 
range of social background and its rather vague ideological platform, mainly 
based on the Thatcherian principle of liberal market economy. This attitude em‑
phasised the defence of Italian national interests. As Lucia Quaglia underlined 
in 2001, ‘the position of its leaders on EU issues is still unclear’ (Quaglia 2003). 
Silvio Berlusconi’s government demonstrated its soft Euroscepticism in a variety 
of ways. First, it attempted to re ‑negotiate the Treaty on the European Union in 
1997 in order to join the EMU without fulfilling the convergence criteria. Next, 
it decided not to participate in the project of the Airbus A400M military trans‑
port aircraft (2001). Additionally, members of Berlusconi’s like Tremonti and 
Martino voiced soft Eurosceptic views regarding the introduction of the Euro.
These eurosceptic elements can also be considered as the manifestation of 
latent individual Euroscepticism in the Italian society (Quaglia 2003: 7–20). 
Bardi Luciano expressed a similar opinion on Forza Italia: ‘Forza Italia is one 
of the most ambivalent Italian parties with regard to attitudes towards the EU. 
Documents and manifestoes concerning EP elections are imbued with all the 
classic elements of pro ‑European rhetoric. In other documents and positions, 
however, the party’s attitude is more detached and less enthusiastic, especially 
if compared with that of Italian Catholic and moderate left parties. FI’s hesita‑
tions are particularly visible on issues having implications for domestic fiscal 
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and budgetary policies, and also on foreign policy and security questions, prob‑
ably in view of the party’s preference for a stronger and closer relationship with 
the United States.’ (Bardi 2007: 10) As Conti argues, ‘European integration is 
not at the centre of the ideology of FI, where the market is, instead, the focus’ 
(Conti 2003: 26). Forza Italia joined the European Peoples’ Party in 1999. This 
fact largely contributed to the party gaining political power.
In 1995, the National Alliance (AN) replaced the nationalist and post ‑fascist 
Italian Social Movement (MSI). The extreme wing of the MSI created the new 
party, the MSI ‑Tricolour Flame, which represented a soft eurosceptic attitude, 
and the idea of a ‘Europe of nations’. The AN maintaining an intergovernmental 
approach, had a more pro ‑European attitude than its predecessor, the MSI, in 
order to realise the political rehabilitation of the party. From the beginning, 
Gianfranco Fini’s main aim was to lead the party toward the political centre, 
creating a new centre ‑right Gaullist party. The Statute (1995, Fiuggi) empha‑
sised the ‘Europe des patries of de Gaulle’. At the conference of Verona (1998) 
the final document still proposed the reduction of the significance of national 
government by increasing the power of the European Parliament’ (Bardi 2007: 
7). Minister for Telecommunications of the second Berlusconi government, 
Maurizio Gasparri, emphasised that ‘on the one hand there has to be a greater 
political and democratic legitimisation of the [EU] institutions; on the other 
hand, there has to be a more balanced promotion of national interests’ (Secolo 
d’Italia 2001; Quaglia 2003: 13–14).
The right ‑wing, neo ‑populist Northern League was officially founded in 1991 
as a federation of leagues from different northern regions. The party won its first 
important success in the 1983 elections, when in the region 4.3 percent of voters 
supported the party. In the second half of the 1980s, however, the centre of the 
different regional leagues moved over to Lombardy, and their leader, Umberto 
Bossi, received a seat in Senate in 1987. Bossi who recognised the limitation of 
the ethno ‑regionalism, created the Northern League in 1991. The case of this 
regionalist party is interesting because the LN changed its position regarding 
the European integration from a pro ‑European to a eurosceptic standpoint. The 
Lombard League, the predecessor of the Northern League, often referred in its 
political ideology to the European Integration Process. Already in the 1980s 
they envisioned the token of the independence of Lombardy in a Europe organ‑
ised on a federative basis. The basis of legitimazing their anti ‑constitutional, 
secessionist intentions was provided by the just deepening European Integra‑
tion. Nevertheless, they conceptualised Europe as a confederation of regions 
with the broadest possible competencies (concept of Europe of Regions). They 
considered the Integration as an alternative to national identity. They did not 
support the development of an integration based on nation ‑states, centrally 
governed from Brussels (Diamanti 1993: 161).
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Umberto Bossi, in his book ‘Wind of the North’, wrote about the birth of re‑
gional states and the formation of a ‘Europe of Regions,’ or a Europe of peoples. 
Obviously, the constantly growing competence of the Brussels bureaucracy did 
not fit into this picture. The goal of this party was to create ‘the federal Europe of 
regions’ based on the inter ‑regional (not inter ‑governmental) principle (Bossi – 
Vimercati 1992). Umberto Bossi envisaged the role of Brussels as threatening 
the danger of becoming a ‘new Rome’.
Nevertheless, in 1993 the League voted in favour of the ratification of the TEU. 
They considered the establishment of the Committee of the Regions a major 
step forward that could lead to the transformation of the EP into a federation 
with two chambers, since, according to their plans, the upper chamber of the 
European Parliament would fulfil the task of representing the sub ‑national 
regions (Diamanti 1993: 166). During the first Berlusconi government in 1994, 
the Northern League argued that it represented a strong pro ‑European approach, 
without any eurosceptic attitude. The LN represented the stance that Italy had 
to fulfil the convergence criteria in order to enter the Single Currency Zone. 
Umberto Bossi, the leader of the LN, wrote a letter to the European Commis‑
sion asking about the possibility for Padania to join EMU (Quaglia 2003: 15; 
Giordano 2004).
The Northern League, on their Milan Congress in 1997, officially accepted 
the party’s strategy. Indeed, the party’s motto suited the previous views of the 
NL concerning the integration: ‘free Padania in a free Europe’. Their goal was 
to achieve a ‘federation based on the cooperation of independent ‘small na‑
tions’. In this period the NL built their strategy on the fact that Italy was not 
expected to become a member of the EMU. According to the party this would 
have strengthened the secessionist inclination in the people of the Northern 
regions and the formation of a unified Northern identity (Luverà 1997: 88).
The Northern League solidified its eurosceptic stance following Italy’s official 
qualification to join the EMU, which the NL declined to support during parlia‑
ment voting. After joining the EMU at the millennium, the popular support for 
the NL decreased significantly (in 2001 3,9 percent and in 2006 4,1 percent). 
At the same time, Umberto Bossi and the NL began to express increasingly 
eurosceptic views (La Padania 2002a; La Padania 2002b).
In 2000, at the Pontida meeting of the NL, Umberto Bossi claimed that the EU 
did not only threaten large nation states, but also small nations. He expressed 
his view that emphasising the principle of subsidiarity was only necessary in 
order to mislead people, as it was only useful for concentrating power at the 
community level. (Bossi 2000) According to Umberto Bossi, the European left 
was striving to create a super ‑state similar to the Soviet Union (Bossi 2001). 
All over Europe there was a surge of indignation after Bossi called the EU ‘the 
USSR of the West’ and a ‘Stalinist superstate’ (Bossi 2002). Although the Italian 
government had a traditional pro ‑Turkish approach, the Northern League stood 
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against the opening of the accession process to Turkey because of its Muslim tra‑
ditions and its large population, despite the fact that the accession process was 
supported by the main Italian parties. No widespread debate occurred within 
Italian society over the question of the Turkish accession (EU–25 WATCH No. 
2: 127–128). Following the general elections of 2006, the LN formed the oppo‑
sition and represented a soft eurosceptic attitude. In general they emphasised 
that the Euro was the cause of the crisis of Northern Italy’s small industries.
By 2007, it became clear that the Italian political processes in the short term 
would result in the formation of a bipolar party system. One of the major signs 
of this process was that beginning from 2007, the process of fusions between 
parties accelerated at both sides of the Italian political spectrum. Despite con‑
flicts between ideologically similar parties, the following two years witnessed 
the rise of two mass parties: People of Freedom and the Democratic Party. The 
centre ‑left Democratic Party was established in October 2007 under the leader‑
ship of Walter Veltroni following the dissolution of the Democrats of the Left 
(DS) and the Margherita, as the successor of the Olive ‑tree Coalition. Veltroni, 
reacting to the political tensions in Italy, grouped the political goals of the party 
around four main topics: the environment, agreement between generations, job 
training, and security. The definition of the position of this new political agent 
among the European political parties, however, proved to be very difficult and 
inspired debates among politicians. The party embraced politicians from both 
from the left wing and from the former Christian Democrats. That is why the 
Socialist Group in the European Parliament adopted a new name: Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S & D). The Party’s Manifesto stated that 
‘The process of the European unification is still restrained by the strong resist‑
ance of nationalistic egoism, which the Democratic Party intends to withstand 
in order to realise a complete political and democratic integration (Partito 
Democratico 2008).
The creation of the new centre ‑right mass party, the People of Freedom, was 
prepared by Silvio Berlusconi in 2007, and officially finalised during a party 
congress on 27–29 March 2009 with the fusion of Forza Italia and the National 
Alliance. The new party still has a wide social background and a rather vague 
ideological platform. As emphasised in the ‘Charter of Values’ (Popolo della 
Libetá 2009) of the People of Freedom, the major ideological issues and goals 
of the party were its ‘Christian’ and ‘liberal’ character, the defence of traditional 
values as well as of individual responsibility and self ‑determination, the adher‑
ence of the party to the values and the platform of the European People’s Party 
(EPP), and its support for European integration
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Post ‑EU ‑accession Crisis: Hungary
After the EU accession, the ‘EUphoria’ in Hungarian society was soon replaced 
by a feeling of disappointment (‘EUphobia’). This happened partly because the 
accession took place later than expected and partly because it did not fulfil the 
sometimes exaggerated hopes of convergence to the EU average (incomes), let 
alone the communication deficit regarding the accession. According to data 
gathered in 2004, the proportion of those who thought that EU membership 
would be advantageous for Hungary peaked in autumn 2002 at 76 percent, fol‑
lowed by consistent decline (Eurobarometer, 2004b). During the next one and 
a half years, as ‘the requirements set and support offered by the Union became 
clear’, the proportion of optimists decreased by 18 percentage points by spring 
of 2004, ‘when only 58 percent of Hungarian citizens professed to believe 
that EU membership would be advantageous for the country’. Among the new 
member states, Hungary still remained one of the three most optimistic coun‑
tries regarding the advantages expected from EU membership (Eurobarometer, 
2004b, 1: 4). Still, it is worth mentioning that Hungary received a chance to 
become closer to the more developed European nations, because Hungary was 
less developed than the rest of the EU, in 2004 the GNP per capita in six regions 
of Hungary was below 75 percent of the EU average (38.25 percent – 60.47 per‑
cent), and only that of Central Hungary was 89.24 percent of the EU average.
Post ‑accession factors have played some role in popularizing Euroscepti‑
cism in Hungary following the accession to the EU. During the government of 
the second conservative coalition (1998–2002), two small parties took a hard 
Eurosceptic position. The far right Hungarian Justice and Life and the Hungar‑
ian Workers’ Party adopted a strong opposition to Hungary’s EU membership. 
According to Taggart and Szczerbiak, ‘soft Euroscepticism’ was taken up by two 
parties in the then governing coalition, FIDESZ and the Smallholders Party 
(the smaller partner). The leader of FIDESZ, Prime Minister Victor Orban, 
was increasingly accepting ‘national interest’ Euroscepticism (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2001: 16).
It became evident that in most of Hungary’s regions, there has not been 
any economic convergence toward more developed areas of the EU in recent 
years. Moreover, in the case of some Hungarian regions, a certain amount of 
divergence can be observed.
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Table 2: GDP per capita (PPP), percentage of the EU average of NUTS3 regions 
of Hungary
NUTS 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Central Hungary 99.9 101.2 103.3 105.1 102.9 105 109
Central Transdanubia 58.0 60.1 59.3 57.0 57 58 54
Western Transdanubia 67.7 65.9 62.6 63.2 61.5 62 60
Southern Transdanubia 45.6 45.0 43.7 42.6 42.7 44 45
Northern Hungary 40.6 41.9 41.5 40.3 40.1 40 40
Northern Great Plain 41.8 41.4 40.1 39.1 39.4 40 42
Southern Great Plain 43.6 44.1 42.8 41.9 41.8 43 43
Source: Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
The Eurobarometer of October 2006 already clearly showed Hungarian soci‑
ety’s disappointment in the EU accession. Since the spring of that year, support 
for membership has dropped by a further 10 to 39 percent, probably due to the 
country’s domestic political issues such as elections, growing economic prob‑
lems, and a general feeling of uncertainty (Eurobarometer 2006: 6).
By 2007, the support for membership had further decreased, as is evident in 
the following Eurobarometer statistics. Although general support of the EU had 
never been as high as in 2007, that year showed the lowest level of support ever 
in Hungary’s history: 57 percent of EU citizens thought that their country’s mem‑
bership was ‘a good thing’, and only 15 percent viewed the membership in an 
entirely negative light. This indicated a 4 percent rise as compared to the previ‑
ous Eurobarometer. Contrary to these findings, 40 percent of Hungarians did 
not consider the EU accession beneficial for their country, and only 37 percent 
claimed that it was ‘a good thing’. Hungarians were among the most pessimistic 
citizens, both with regard to the issue of membership (ranked 25th place) and 
to the advantages of membership (27th place) (Eurobarometer 2007: 15–16).
According to the data gathered for the Standard Eurobarometer recorded 
in autumn, 2008, Hungarian pessimism can be traced already in the answers 
to the first set of questions, as only 31 percent of the respondents evaluated 
membership positively, in contrast with the EU average of 53 percent. It is worth 
noting that in autumn of 2004 the percentage of positive responses was still 
high, at 49 percent. While 60 percent of the EU average citizens claimed that 
the EU imposed its opinion on the member states, only 57 percent of Hungar‑
ians shared this view. At the same time, and in contrast to the EU average of 60 
percent, only 47 percent of Hungarians thought that their country’s opinion 
counted at the European level (Eurobarometer 2008: 31–32).
3 In the EU, regional statistics are based on a common classification of territorial units: the Nomencla-
ture of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). NUTS has three regional levels, each with minimum and 
maximum thresholds for the average population size of the regions.
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It became evident that following the economic and financial crisis support for 
EU membership has decreased significantly. In 2004, 49 percent of respondents 
considered membership a good thing, whereas by 2011 only 32 percent stated 
that this was the case. The proportion of those stating that membership was 
a bad thing rose from 10 percent to 22 percent between 2004 and 2011, with 
a further rise to 23 percent in 2009 at the peak of the financial crisis, followed 
by a fall to 15 percent in the year of the general elections (2010). In 2010, the 
proportion of respondents stating that EU membership was a ‘good thing’ was 
38 percent as compared to 34 percent in 2009. The change in percentage might 
have reflected new hope for stronger representation and promotion of national 
interests on the EU level. The proportion of respondents who thought that 
membership was ‘neither good nor bad’ also increased, from 36 percent to 44 
percent over the same period.
According to the results of opinion polls conducted by Medián in 2004, 
80 percent of the respondents supported Hungary’s membership in the EU. 
Although in 2011 the percentage had fallen to 68 percent, two ‑thirds of the 
population still supported Hungary’s membership of the EU (Medián 2012). In 
2012, the results of an opinion poll conducted by Századvég showed that less 
than half (49 percent) of the respondents said that membership of the EU was 
beneficial for Hungary and 53 percent did not support further deepening of the 
European integration process (Origo 2012). According to the data gathered by 
the Standard Eurobarometer in 2004 it was shown that 64 percent of Hungar‑
ians ‘tended to trust’ the European Union, while by 2013 this ratio fell to 47 
percent (Eurobarometer 2015).
2010: changing political landscape and debate on the political 
changes
Since the general elections of 2010, the Hungarian political landscape has 
changed significantly due to the high level of protest votes: Fidesz received 
a more than two ‑thirds majority in Parliament, the socialists lost their political 
support, and Jobbik became the third largest party in the country. Moreover, the 
two more important parties of the transition period, namely the liberals (AFD) 
and the MDF, disappeared, and the LMP (Lehet Más a Politika, ‘Politics Can 
Be Different’), a new green and anti ‑corruption party, entered the Parliament.
After the electoral victory of Fidesz Prime Minister Orbán has started to build 
the so ‑called system of national cooperation4 based on the implementation of 
a „central political field of force” (Centralis erőtér) which would replace the 
“dual field of force”, or the antagonistic dualism between the government and 
4 A Nemzeti Együttműködés Programja. 22. maggio 2010. http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/00047/00047.
pdf
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the opposition. A very important element of the process of centralization and 
strengthening of the state was the drafting and approval of the new constitution 
(Basic Law).5 The political changes and the new constitution have also received 
criticism from the Venice Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council 
of Europe, the EU institutions (European Parliament, European Commission, 
infringement procedures), and the United States of America. (Venice Commis‑
sion, 2011). According to the critics of the constitutional framework the process 
was too fast, not transparent, and, as debated by the opposition parties and by 
EU institutions, considered by the left ‑wing opposition as a sign of the decon‑
solidation of liberal democracy and a move from liberal democracy to centralised 
illiberal or partial democracy. (European Parliament 2011; Friedman 2016)
There is reason to emphasise that the words ‘liberal’ and ‘liberalism’ have 
become used almost as swear words in the Hungarian society and in the political 
debate, due to the negative attitude in society towards the high level of liber‑
alisation and privatisation of the Hungarian economy, and due to the negative 
public opinion about the most recent socialist ‑liberal governments. The main 
reason for the crisis of liberalism is the decline in support for the political and 
economic transition, the decline in trust in the function of democracy, the high 
level of corruption among politicians, and the worsening economic situation 
of Hungary. In 2011 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
presented its document on transition economies (the Transition Report), which 
showed a decline in public support for democracy and the market economy 
in the countries that joined the EU (EBRD 2011). The decrease in support for 
democracy was higher in countries hard hit by the financial crisis (Krugman, 
2011). Hungary was among the European countries most seriously impacted 
by the international financial crisis after 2008, and is finding itself in a deep 
economic recession until 2014. The country has had economic problems since 
the beginnings of the 21st century. Due to Hungary’s high budget deficit, the 
European Union’s excessive deficit procedure has been in place against Hungary 
since its year of entry to the EU.
In May 2013 the European Parliament made public a draft version of the re‑
port on the state of fundamental rights in Hungary prepared by the EP’s Commit‑
tee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (rapporteur MEP Rui Tavares). 
The draft document was criticised by the Hungarian government saying that 
it is based on false premises. The case of the so ‑called Tavares report demon‑
strated very well the standpoint of the Hungarian government regarding the 
European Union, which can be defined as Euro ‑realism, or a soft Euroscepticism 
based on national interests and national ‑sovereignty. This case also made clear 
that a European political space had been created, where domestic political af‑
5 Kormany.hu, n d b, ‘The Fundamental Law of Hungary’, http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/c3/30000/
THE percent20FUNDAMENTAL percent20LAW percent20OF percent20HUNGARY.pdf
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fairs became European ones, causing several heated debates among European 
politicians in different institutions of the EU (European Parliament 2013). 
FIDESZ’s attitude regarding the EU focusing on the defence of Hungarian na‑
tional interests has become very fluid, floating between pro ‑EU and Eurosceptic 
standpoints because of the wide range of its supporters’ social background and 
the party’s rather vague ideological platform (Fidesz 2009; BBC 2012; Fidesz 
2011, Euractiv 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; Hiradó 2013; Hungarian Spektrum 2013, 
Arató – Koller 2015).
During the second conservative government, Jobbik still expressed semi‑
‑hard or sometimes hard Euro ‑sceptic standpoints, while pro ‑European/euro‑
‑optimist positions were more common among members of the Democratic 
Coalition led by a highly criticised ex ‑socialist party leader, Ferenc Gyurcsány, 
and the LMP. According to a research carried out by the Hungarian Europe So‑
cietz, Fidesz ‘covers internal divisions’, as the research identified two wings in 
Fidesz: ‘a less visible, Euro ‑constructive one and a noisier, Euro ‑pessimist one 
led by Viktor Orbán’ (Európa Társaság 2013: 4). At the national level, the MSZP 
carefully avoids taking a position in debates concerning the future of the EU. 
Only the LMP has a coherent federalist vision of the EU (in its 2010 electoral 
manifesto) (Európa Társaság 2013: 4).
As a result of the 2010 parliamentary elections, Jobbik became the third main 
party in Hungary, with 17 percent of the votes. Its popularity is highly connected 
to the economic problems in Hungary (in 2010 the GDP was −6.3 percent, and 
the unemployment rate was above 11 percent), and to the disappointment in 
the process of democratisation and Europeanisation due to the high level of 
corruption. The characteristic features of Jobbik’s extreme rightist ideology are 
anti ‑democratic feelings, nationalism, chauvinism, and racism. They usually 
do not reject the application of radical methods in resolving social problems.
Jobbik, like extreme right nationalistic parties in general, represents a semi‑
‑hard Euro ‑sceptic standpoint in not supporting the further deepening of 
integration. The party appeared to see the integration as standing for a su‑
pranational political structure that aims at the renewed suppression of small 
countries. In Hungary, the reason for growing Euro ‑scepticism is probably the 
lack of economic growth following the accession (2004) and the disillusionment 
with the process of democratisation and liberalisation (Vona 2009; Teol 2009).
Accession to the EU brought about a serious trauma for Hungary, known 
as the “post ‑accession crisis”. Under the influence of the change of the regime, 
there was, on the one hand, a social ‑structural crisis, because the economic 
deficit was transformed into social deficit during the process of crisis manage‑
ment. On the other hand, the new democratic state had no time to develop fully, 
and thus remained weak. Fast ‑paced democratization led to a serious social 
deficit, namely to economic and social insecurity. When Hungary’s accession 
to the EU was achieved, the state and civil society were still weak. It was this 
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fact that caused trauma; the country was not ready for accession either from the 
point of view of societal capacity or of the state of development of the institu‑
tional structure. In addition, the onset of the so ‑called “accession and reform 
exhaustion” has resulted in the rise of populism (Ágh 2008: 94–95). In 2010, 
the new governing coalition answered to this challenge with the strengthening 
and centralising state capacities, and with a quiet populist approach based on 
emphasised promotion of national sovereignty.
Italy – Third Republic?
There is still the question of whether following the resignation of Berlusconi 
(2011) as prime minister, the transition to the Third Republic has started or not. 
But we must emphasise that there is a changing political landscape, the end of 
bipolarism, and the fragmentation of the party system (Terza Forza, M5S) has 
started again. Due to the wave of corruption scandals and to Italians’ eroding 
confidence in their politicians, the Italian party ‑system transformed significantly.
The birth of a new populist, anti ‑political movement, the Five Stars Move‑
ment (M5S) was a clear symptom of the deep crisis of Italian representative 
democracy. This political movement, taking advantage of the possibilities of 
direct democracy offered by the web, in 2013 became the third largest politi‑
cal party in the country, gathering 26 percent of the votes at general elections 
and filling the political gap left behind by PdL and LN. Created following the 
beginning of financial crisis, M5S has positioned itself in opposition to existing 
political parties and the traditional elites. Its aim is destroying the established 
party system. We can observe that since the beginning, it has represented the 
anger of the Italian electorate.
M5S has an unclear picture of EU and embraces soft eurosceptic standpoints. 
In 2013 it started to prepare a referendum on EU membership and on the Euro. 
Beppe Grillo said that ‘’Europe should be rethought,’’ It is more against the 
Euro and the EU ‑imposed austerity policies.
Following the resignation of Berlusconi in 2011, the governments of Monti 
and Letta have clearly returned to the traditional EU ‑policy of Cristian Demo‑
crats supporting more an integration in terms of a banking union, fiscal union, 
and Eurobonds. We can easily observe a growing gap between the Italian politi‑
cal elite and Italian public opinion. The ambitious Renzi government has started 
to implement the political and economic reforms in order to lead the country 
toward the “third republic”.
Conclusion
Both Italy and Hungary have had difficulties of different types of transitions, 
and both have been hit hard by financial and economic crises. The two coun‑
tries semi ‑peripheral positions have been strengthened by the economic and 
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financial crisis. Jobbik and M5S are the clear symptoms of the deep crisis of 
representative democracy in Hungary and Italy. There is growing populism and 
euroscepticism due to the disadvantages of joining the EU and the Euro ‑zone, 
and due to the persistent democratic deficit of the EU. As a consequence, the 
EU has extended its competences to override national governments on timely 
issues, such as pension reform. In the case of Hungary, we can observe the 
process from EU ‑foria to EU ‑fobia (Euroscepticis). In the case of Italy, we can 
trace the process from Euro ‑enthusiasm to Euro ‑delusion.
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EU-27 Watch. No.7. Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin: http://www.eu -consent.net/library/
eu25watch/EU-27_Watch_No7.pdf.
Euractiv (2013a) Hungary and the Rule of Law – Statement of the European Commission 
in the Plenary Debate of the European Parliament’, 17 April 2013, European Commission, 
SPEECH/13/324, http://europa.eu/rapid/press -release_SPEECH-13-324_en.htm?locale=en.
Euractive (2013b): Commission accuses Hungary of transgressions, 18 April 2013: http://www.
euractiv.com/future -eu/commission -lists -hungary -transgr -news-519202.
Euractiv (2013c): Viktor Orbán angry at EU’s criticism of Hungary’s democratic values, 3 July 
2013: http://www.euractiv.com/video/viktor -orban -angry -eus -criticism-529065.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/3/19 12:53 PM
78 Analysis of the Voting Behaviour of Czech Members of European Parliament… Ondřej Mocek
Eurobarometer (2004): The future Europea Constitution. June–July 2004. Flash Eurobarometer: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl159_2en.pdf.
Eurobarometer (2004a): The social situation in the European Union: http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KE -AG-04-001/EN/KE -AG-04-001-EN.PDF.
Eurobarometer (2004b): Public opinion in the candidate countries, National Report, Executive 
summary, Hungary, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/exec_hu.pdf.
Eurobarometer (2005): National Report, Executive Summary, Italy, Eurobarometer 63: http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_exec_it.pdf.
Eurobarometer (2006): National Report, Executive Summary, Italy, Eurobarometer 65. 2006 
spring http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_it_exec.pdf.
Eurobarometer (2006, Autumn): Standard Eurobarometer 66, Public opinion in the European 
Union: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf.
Eurobarometer (2007), National Report, Executive Summary, Italy, Eurobarometer 67. 2007 
spring: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_it_exec.pdf.
Eurobarometer (2007, Spring): Standard Eurobarometer 67, Public opinion in the European 
Union: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb_67_first_en.pdf.
Eurobarometer (2008): National Report, Executive Summary, Italy, Eurobarometer 69: http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_it_exe.pdf.
Eurobarometer (2008, Autumn): Standard Eurobarometer 70, Public opinion in the European 
Union: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_first_en.pdf.
Eurobarometer  (2015) :  http://ec.europa.eu/publ ic_opinion/cf/showtable.
cfm?keyID=2193 & nationID=8,&startdate=2003.11 & enddate=2015.05; http://ec.europa.
eu/public_opinion/cf/showtable.cfm?keyID=2193 & nationID=8,&startdate=2003.11 & end-
d a t e = 2 0 1 5 . 0 5 ;  h t t p : / / e c . e u r o p a . e u / p u b l i c _ o p i n i o n / c f / s h o w t a b l e .
cfm?keyID=2193 & nationID=22,&startdate=2004.10 & enddate=2015.05
Európa Társaság (2013): Where Does the PERC Index Stand? Or: From EU Destructives to 
Federalists: Relationship of the Hungarian Parties to the European Union, Executive Sum-
mary, http://www.europatarsasag.hu/images/2013Jan/PERC percent20 percent20executive 
percent20summary.pdf.
European Parliament (2011): European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2011 on media law in 
Hungary: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-
2011-0094+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
European Parliament (2013): MEPs voice concerns over constitutional changes in Hungary, 
Justice and home affairs, 17 April 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/
content/20130416STO07356/html/MEPs -voice -concerns -over -constitutional -changes -in-
-Hungary.
Eurostat (2008): Economy 2008: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-
-CD-07-001-01/EN/KS -CD-07-001-01-EN.PDF.
Fabbrini (2009): The Transformation of Italian Democracy. Bulletin of Italian Politics 1 (1): 29–47.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/3/19 12:53 PM
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 12 (2016) 3 79
Fidesz (2009): Igen, Magyarország többre képes: http://static.fidesz.hu/download/yar/pro-
gram2009_magyar.pdf.
Fidesz (2011): EU stronger than at start of Hungarian presidency, 5 July 2011, (MTI -fidesz.hu): 
http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=165020.
Friedman, George (2016): Hungary, Poland and illiberal democracy: https://www.euractiv.com/
section/global -europe/opinion/hungary -poland -and -illiberal -democracy/.
Gabel, M., Whitten G. (1997): Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, And Public Support 
For European Integration, Political Behaviour 19: 81–96.
Gabel, M (1998): Public support for European Integration: An Empirical test of five Theories, 
Journal of Politics vol. 60.
Giordano, B. (2004): The politics of the northern league and Italy’s changing attitude towards 
Europe. Perspectives on European Politics and Society 5 (1): 61–79.
Hagemann, S. – Hix, S. (2009): Could Changing the Electoral Rules Fix European Parliament 
Elections? http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/Working_Papers/Hix_Hagemann -Can_EP_Elec-
tions_Be_Fixed-14Jan09.pdf.
Hegedűs, I. (2005): Magyarország és a magyar média belépése az Európai Unióba:
/Accession to the EU of Hungary and the Hungarian media / www.mediakuato.hu /media 
researcher/ 2005. 05. 02.
Hirado (2013): EP approves Tavares report on fundamental rights in Hungary, http://www.hirado.
hu/Hirek/2013/07/03/19/EP_approves_Tavares_report_on_fundamental_rights_in.aspx.
Horváth, J. (2000): Követő külpolitika. Az olasz Európa -politika a második világháború után. In 
Kiss J. László (ed), A tizenötök Európái. Közösségi politikák – nemzeti politikák. Osiris, 193–226.
Hungarian Spektrum (2013): Viktor Orbán’s answer to the Tavares report, http://hungarianspec-
trum.wordpress.com/2013/07/04/viktor -orbans -answer -to -the -tavares -report/comment-
-page-1/.
Ignazi, P. (2002): L’intramontabile fascino del populismo. Il Mulino 1: 59–66.
Il sole 24 ore. 2000. október 14. 1–3.
Juhász, J. and Tálas, P. (2008): A szélsőjobboldal, a jobboldali radikalizmus és a populizmus 
előretörésének okairól Kelet- és Közép -Európában’ in Európai Tükör, 2008/4, 116–124.
Kégler, Á. (2004): Európai Parlamenti kampány: Hazabeszélnek’, Figyelő 2004/15, 20–21.
Kopecky, P. and Mudde, C. (2002): The two sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European 
Integration in East Central Europe, European Union Politics vol. 3.
Kormány, A. (2006): Vélemények az EU tagságról és annak következményeiről, in Európai Tükör, 
2006/10: 89–97.
Kormany.hu, n d b, The Fundamental Law of Hungary, http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/
c3/30000/THE percent20FUNDAMENTAL percent20LAW percent20OF percent20HUNGARY.
pdf.
Kormany.hu, n.d.a, ‘The history of Hungarian EU membership’, http://eu.kormany.hu/the -history-
-of -hungarian -eu -membership.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/3/19 12:53 PM
80 Analysis of the Voting Behaviour of Czech Members of European Parliament… Ondřej Mocek
Körösényi, András and Patkós, Veronika (2015): Liberális és illiberális populizmus: Berlusconi és 
Orbán politikai vezetése. Politikatudományi Szemle, 24 (2): 29–54. ISSN 1216-1438.
Krugman, P. (2011): Depression and Democracy, The New Yourk Times, 11 December 2011. http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/opinion/krugman -depression -and -democracy.html?_r=0.
La Padania (2002/a): Che Ue vogliamo, questione fondamentale: www.lapadania.com/2002/
gennaio/06/06012002p03a4.htm.
La Padania (2002b): Francesco Speroni: Con la devolution parte il vero cambiamento: www.
lapadania.com/2002/gennaio/06/06012002p05a2.htm
La Repubblica (2002): Ruggiero rompe il silenzio Con la Lega non potevo stare: http://www.
repubblica.it/online/politica/berlueuropa/ruggiero/ruggiero.html.
La Repubblica (2006): Fmi: L’Italia cresce meno. Dure sfide per il nuovo governo: http://www.
repubblica.it/2006/04/sezioni/economia/conti -pubblici-1/previsioni -fmi/previsioni -fmi.html.
Luverà, B (1997): La politica estera della Lega. Limes 1997. 2: 87–96.
Mair, P. (2000): The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party System in West European 
Politics, 27–51.
Marján, A. (2006): Az EU -bővítés: vissza- és előretekintés’, in Európai Tükör, 2006/11, 5–16.
Mayr, W. (2009): Hungary’s Peaceful Revolution: Cutting the Fence and Changing History, 29 
May 09, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/hungary -s-peaceful -revolution -cutting-
-the -fence -and -changing -history -a-627632.html.
Medián (2005): Jogállamiság, demokrácia, parlamentarizmus – a, Eötvös Károly Intézet és az 
ELTE ÁJK Jogszociológiai Tanszéke megbízásából.
Medián (2012): Egy szabadságharc frontvonalai: A közvélemény az IMF -tárgyalásokról és az EU-
-ról, 2012. március 19, http://www.median.hu/object.90dcfe43-2f4b-448d -adb4-6bb74fdf1129.
ivy.
Molnár, Anna (2013): EU membership and the question of Hungary’s sovereignty: Ideas of the 
European Union before and following the crisis” In: Lise Rye (ed.) Distant voices: Ideas on 
democracy and the Eurozone crisis. Trondheim: Akademika forlag, 75–105.
Molnár, Anna (2012): Ideas of Europe in Italian political discourse. ACADEMIC AND APPLIED 
RESEARCH IN MILITARY SCIENCE 11 (1): 81–105.
Molnár Anna (2011): Idea of Europe in Hungarian political discourse In: Cláudia Toris Ramos (ed.) 
Ideas of Europe in National Political Discourse. Bologna: Il Mulino, 229–263.
Napolitano, G. (2007): Discorso del Presidente della Repubblica Giorgio Napolitano in occasione 
della visita al Parlamento Europeo” 14 Febbraio 2007 Parlamento Europeo: http://foreign-
policy.it/cgi -bin/news/adon.cgi?act=doc & doc=2638 & sid=17.
Napolitano, G. (2008): Dichiarazione del Presidente Napolitano sull’esito del referendum in 
Irlanda relativo alla ratifica del Trattato di Lisbona. 13-06-2008: http://www.quirinale.it/
Comunicati/Comunicato.asp?id=36155.
Navracsics, T. (1997): A missing debate? Hungary and the European Union, Sussex European 
Institute SEI Working Paper, No. 21, Sussex European Institute http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/
documents/wp21.pdf.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/3/19 12:53 PM
POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 12 (2016) 3 81
Origo (2012): Századvég – kedvezőtlenül alakul Magyarország uniós tagságának a megítélése, 
2012. március 19, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20120131-szazadveg -kedvezotlenul -alakul-
-magyarorszag -unios -tagsaganak -a-megitelese.html.
Padoa -Schioppa, T. (2005): Non mentire sul no francese, Il Mulino, luglio -agosto 2005. 636–643.
Partito Democratico (2008): Manifesto dei Valori del Partito Democratico, Approvato il 16 feb-
braio 2008, http://www.ulivo.it/allegatidef/Manifestodeivalori44883.pdf.
Pistone, S. (ed.): L’Italia e L’Unitá Europea, Torino, Loescher,1982.
Politics (2013): EP approval of Tavares report European left -wing’s scheme, Orbán says, 5 July 
2013, http://www.politics.hu/20130705/ep -approval -of -tavares -report -european -left -wings-
-scheme -orban -says/.
Popolo della Libetá (2009): Carta dei Valori, http://www.ilpopolodellaliberta.it/notizie/15346/
carta -dei -valori.
Prodi (2006): Celebrazioni dei 50 anni dei Trattati di Roma. Discorso del Presidente del Consiglio 
Romano Prodi. 23 March 2007, Senato della Repubblica, 23 marzo 2007. http://foreignpolicy.
it/cgi -bin/news/adon.cgi?act=doc & doc=2735 & sid=17.
Quaglia, L. (2003): Euroscepticism in Italy and Centre -Right and Right Wing Political Parties.” 
RSCAS, European University Institut. SEI Working Paper No: 60.
Senato (2009): Elezioni europee: è legge la soglia di sbarramento al 4 per cento, 18 febbraio 
2009 http://mobile.senato.it/notizie/8766/163120/164601/165376/165378/gennotizianew.htm
Serricchio, F.: Italian Citizens and Europe: Explaining the Growth of Euroscepticism. Bulletin of 
Italian Politics 4 (1): 115–134.
Sükösd, M. (2005): Kommunikációs deficit Magyarország Európai Uniós csatlakozásának média-
-bemutásában : megoldási irányok és nyilvánosság -modellekok, in Médiakutató 73–83.
Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2001): Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU 
Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe, Sussex European Institute Working Paper 
No. 46, Sussex European Institute, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/wp46.pdf.
Tavares, R (2013): Draft Report on the situation of fundamental rights: standards a nd practices 
in Hungary, European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=- percent2F percent2FEP percent2F 
percent2FNONSGML percent2BCOMPARL percent2BPE-508.211 percent2B02 percent2BDOC 
percent2BPDF percent2BV0 percent2F percent2FEN.
Teló, M. (1996): L’Italia nel processo di costruzione europea. In: Storia dell’Italia Repubblicana, 
vol.3. Toroino, Einaudi, 1996. 195–197.
Teol (2009): A Jobbik felszámolná a poronty bizniszt, 7 September 2009, http://www.teol.hu/
tolna/kozelet/a -jobbik -felszamolna -a-poronty -bizniszt-255753.
Uitz, R. (2008): Hungary in: Grigorij Mesežnikov, Oľga Gyárfášová, and Daniel Smilov: Populist 
politics and liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Bratislava, Institute for Public 
Affairs. http://www.ivo.sk/buxus/docs/publikacie/subory/Populist_politics.pdf.
Vaciago, G. (2001): Stare in Europa, ovvero i vincoli dell’unione. Il Mulino 2001. 2: 206–210.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/3/19 12:53 PM
82 Analysis of the Voting Behaviour of Czech Members of European Parliament… Ondřej Mocek
Venice Commission (2011): Strasbourg, 20 June 2011, Opinion no. 621 / 2011, CDL -AD(2011)016 
Or. Engl. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Opinion 
on the new Constitution of Hungary, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th Plenary 
Session, Venice, 17–18 June 2011.
Vona, G. (2009): A  Magyar Gárda nem adja fel, 3 February 2009, http://www.mno.hu/
portal/606865?searchtext=Vona percent20G percentC3 percent A1bor.
Anna Molnár is an Associate Professor at the National University of Public Service 
(Budapest) and Head of the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy. 
She is the Head of International Public Management bachelor’s program. She was 
the Head of Programme of MA in international studies at the University of Pannonia 
(Institute of Social Sciences and International Studies, Veszprém) between 2010 and 
2013. She received her Ph.D. in international relations from the Corvinus University 
of Budapest (2003). Her published papers cover a wide range of topics whose central 
theme is focusing on security studies, EU CFSP/CSDP, europeanization of Hungary, 
the European Union’s Mediterranean policy and on the Italian history and politics. 
She gives courses at Hungarian and foreign universities on European integration, 
international studies and Italian politics. She had a Bolyai Research Fellowship of 
the Hungarian Academy of Science (2007–2010). Email: Molnar.Anna@nke ‑uni.hu.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/3/19 12:53 PM
